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Abstract 
Duke University organized the International Conference on Reconstructing Climate 
Policy: Moving Beyond the Kyoto Impasse, May 2003. The organizer invited me to 
specifically address the following two issues at the conference: 1) Whether is the 
proposal for joint accession by the U.S. and China in the interest of China?, and 2) Even 
if participating a global cap-and-trade regime is so beneficial to China as many economic 
studies suggest, why has China consistently refused in international negotiations even to 
discuss its participation in it?. In this paper, we look at the first issue from the following 
perspectives: a) how does China value importance of maintaining unity of the Group of 
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77?; b) what lessons has China learned from bilateral negotiations with the U.S. to work 
out the terms for China to get accession to the WTO?; c) what is the legitimacy of the 
U.S. insistence that it re-joins the Kyoto Protocol only if major developing countries 
join?; d) what are implications of the U.S. strikingly reversed position on the 
commitments of developing countries in New Delhi for initiating discussions on joint 
accession by the U.S. and China?; and e) how would joint accession by the U.S. and 
China be perceived?. We then address the second issue from the following perspectives: a) 
from the point of view of fairness, how do developing countries including China and 
India perceive emissions caps in the first place?; b) why have China and India been 
sceptical to international emissions trading?; c) how is an inflow of CDM investment in 
China perceived politically in comparison with the exports of emissions permits to the 
U.S.?; d) what are the implications of “lock  in” to emissions cap, in particular no rules 
and principles for setting emissions targets for the commitment periods subsequent to 
Kyoto?; e) how to address the complex undertaking of setting emissions caps for 
developing countries, which must be linked to future, unobserved levels in comparison 
with the historically observed levels for industrialized countries?. Finally, the paper 
touches on the likely path forward. 
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1. Introduction 
In conjunction with the release of the book titled Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond 
Kyoto by Stewart and Wiener (2003), Duke University organized the International 
Conference on Reconstructing Climate Policy: Moving Beyond the Kyoto Impasse, 11-
12 May 2003. The organizer invited me to give an lead speech, specifically asking me to 
address the following two issues:  
• Whether is the proposal for joint accession by the U.S. and China in the interest of 
China? 
• Even if participating a global cap-and-trade regime is so beneficial to China as 
many economic studies suggest, why has China consistently refused in 
international negotiations even to discuss its participation in it?  
 
In this paper, we will look at the first issue from the following perspectives: a) how does 
China value importance of maintaining unity of the Group of 77?; b) what lessons has 
China learned from bilateral negotiations with the U.S. to work out the terms for China to 
get accession to the WTO?; c) what is the legitimacy of the U.S. insistence that it re-joins 
the Kyoto Protocol only if major developing countries join?; d) what are implications of 
the U.S. strikingly reversed position on the commitments of developing countries in New 
Delhi for initiating discussions on joint accession by the U.S. and China?; and e) how 
would joint accession by the U.S. and China be perceived?. We will then address the 
second issue from the following perspectives: a) from the point of view of fairness, how 
do developing countries including China and India perceive emissions caps in the first 
place? Is it perceived an issue of “what is” in positive economics or an issue of “what 
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ought to be” in normative economics?; b) why have China and India been sceptical to 
international emissions trading?; c) how is an inflow of CDM investment in China 
perceived politically in comparison with the exports of emissions permits to the U.S.?; d) 
what are the implications of “lock in” to emissions cap, in particular no rules and 
principles for setting emissions targets for the commitment periods subsequent to Kyoto?; 
e) how to address the complex undertaking of setting emissions caps for developing 
countries, which must be linked to future, unobserved levels in comparison with the 
historically observed levels for industrialized countries?. Finally, the paper touches on the 
likely path forward. 
 
 
2. Joint accession by the U.S. and China 
For quite some time, the U.S. and China have pointed at the other as the culprit who is 
blocking the climate negotiation process. This leads to a dilemma. On the one hand, the 
U.S. rejects the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts major developing countries like China, 
Mexico and India, and thus it is conceivable that the U.S. would not re-join the 
international climate regime without more specific commitments than those general 
commitments from major developing countries. On the other hand, the U.S. withdrawal 
from the Kyoto Protocol leaves plenty of excess hot air of zero costs (Löschel and Zhang, 
2002). This will substantially reduce incentives to invest in clean development 
mechanism (CDM) projects that imply reduced financial flows channelled to developing 
countries through CDM. Given that China is widely regarded as the dominant host 
country of the CDM projects (Zhang, 2000a and 2004), the significant decrease in 
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demand for permits as a result of the world’s largest single buyer remaining outside the 
international market of tradable permits would lower the gain of China substantially. 
Against this background, some American analysts (e.g., Stewart and Wiener, 2003) 
suggest joint accession by the U.S. and China. This proposal does have the merit of 
enhancing environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol and helping stabilize the 
price of permits on the international market. It is certainly in the interest of the U.S. 
because the participation of China would substantially reduce the U.S. compliance costs 
and increase the environmental effectiveness. The question then is whether the joint 
accession proposal is in the interest of China. I doubt the prospects for China’s interest in 
the joint accession proposal for the following reasons. 
 
First, although broad discussions and cooperation in the field of climate change continue 
between China and the U.S., it is doubtful that China would be willing to discuss joint 
cap-and-trade arrangements with the U.S. For historical reasons, China attributes great 
importance to maintaining unity of the Group of 77 (G77), and engaging in discussions 
on joint cap-and-trade arrangements with the U.S. may well be perceived as threatening 
the solidarity of that Group. Developing countries, including China, insist that 
industrialised countries should demonstrate taking the lead in reducing their greenhouse 
gas emissions before developing countries even consider taking on such commitments. 
With the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and a very low scale of overall 
emissions reductions in the industrialised countries during the first commitment period 
(2008-2012), it is unclear whether developing countries would regard their wealthy 
counterparts as having taken the lead by the time of the second commitment period. This 
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leaves it open to even get launching a dialogue on broadening future commitments on the 
negotiating agenda. One thing is clear, though, that when it comes to negotiating 
developing country commitments, it is in the interest of China to join with other 
developing countries and negotiate developing country commitments under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This will give China 
much more clout in the final collective bargaining to determine its emissions 
commitments. 1  International climate negotiations in Bonn and Marrakech clearly 
demonstrate China’s devotion to the Kyoto Protocol. Table 1 shows the positions of 
China and the final decisions in the Marrakech Accords. It clearly shows that China is 
willing to give on many issues in order to keep the Kyoto Protocol alive and that China 
continues to aspire to be recognised as a responsible member of the international 
community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 It is worthwhile mentioning that China had made a concession to U.S. demand for the 
extent of openness for markets of many products and services when undertaking a 
number of rounds of bilateral negotiations with the U.S. to work out the terms for China 
to get accession to the WTO. The reason why China gave in a great deal is because China 
faces both obligations and benefits from getting accession to the WTO. But the situation 
is quite different in case of implementing joint accession by the U.S. and China where 
China may well perceive only costs. 
Table 1  China’s Compromises in the Marrakech package 
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Allowed Nuclear projects under 
CDM 
Allowed Not allowed Unilateral projects under 
CDM 
Give Annex 1 countries 
more representatives 
Geographical 
representation 
Composition of CDM 
Executive Board 
Only CDM All three Kyoto 
mechanisms 
Share of proceeds 
Additional sinks credits 
given to Russia, Japan 
and Canada 
No additional sinks 
credits to Annex 1 
countries 
Sink provisions under 
Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the 
Kyoto Protocol 
CERs, ERUs, AAUs 
fungible 
No fungibility Fungibility between the 
three Kyoto mechanisms 
COP Decision China’s position Issue 
Refrain from using 
nuclear power to generate 
CERs 
Second, the legitimacy of the U.S. insistence that it will re-join the Kyoto Protocol or a 
follow-up regime only if major developing countries join as well is questionable. Given 
that the U.S. is the world’s largest economy and emitter of greenhouse gases, it has both 
the responsibility for the global climate problem and the ability to contribute to solving it. 
To have a significant long-term effect on global greenhouse gas emissions, a global 
climate regime eventually must include substantial participation by developing countries. 
But the U.S. conditioning its commitments on developing countries’ commitments is 
unlikely to induce participation by developing countries. In my view, unless the U.S. has 
made credible commitments itself, it does not have the moral right to persuade 
developing countries to take meaningful abatement actions. International climate 
negotiations prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol suggest that U.S. 
taking on the commitments first and then jawboning developing countries including 
China had some impact on the position of developing countries and the timing of their 
commitments (Zhang, 2000b).2 
                                                 
2 Prior to Kyoto, developing counties’ demand for the U.S. to demonstrate the leadership 
and the EU proposal for a 15% cut in emissions of a basket of three greenhouse gases 
below 1990 levels by 2010 put collective pressure on the U.S., which leads the world in 
greenhouse gas emissions. At Kyoto, the U.S. had made legally binding commitments. 
The Kyoto target is seen as not enough but yet not unreasonable given that the U.S. 
economy would not be disrupted unreasonably. After Kyoto, the ball was kicked into 
China’s court. The U.S. had made it clear that bringing key developing countries, 
including China, on board had been and would continue to be its focus of international 
climate change negotiations. According to some U.S. Senators, it will be countries like 
China, India and Mexico that will decide whether the U.S. will ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 
It is therefore conceivable that the pressure will mount for China to make some kind of 
commitments at the negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires. The world’s media will 
undoubtedly bring attention to China’s non-participation, which will be seen as holding 
up the ratification of the Protocol by the U.S. Senate and possibly even be blamed for 
“blowing up” subsequent negotiations aimed at dealing with developing countries’ 
commitments. The U.S. commitments at Kyoto and diplomatic and public pressure on 
China had put China in a very uncomfortable position. It looked like China would be 
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 Third, developing countries have been sensitive to commitment issues, and the U.S. 
position at the eight Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in New Delhi makes the 
launching of a dialogue on broadening future commitments difficult, not to mention to 
ask developing countries to take on commitments. The U.S. strikingly reversed the 
position on the commitments of developing countries in New Delhi in comparison with 
the position at Kyoto. At Kyoto, the U.S. called for stronger action by developing 
countries, but in New Delhi declared such discussion about developing country’s 
commitments premature. This would have long-term implications because developing 
countries would defend their position using this argument in the future when being asked 
to take on commitments. This certainly complicates initiating discussions on joint 
accession by the U.S. and China. 
 
Fourth, the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol does nothing but erode trust and 
reinforce the stalemate between the North and the South, and it is difficult to imagine that 
China and India would assume emissions targets before the U.S. re-entry into Kyoto or a 
follow-up regime. Doing so would be perceived as rewarding the U.S. for disregarding 
the Protocol.3  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
pressured to take on commitments at much earlier date than what China wished (Zhang, 
2000b). This situation has changed once the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. 
3 The U.S. uses its re-entry of the Kyoto regime as a leverage to take on less stringent 
targets in the later commitment periods.  
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3. Why has China consistently refused in international negotiations even to discuss 
its participation in a global cap-and-trade regime? 
Being the world’s most populous country, China is a large greenhouse gas emissions 
source that grows rapidly in line with its industrialisation and urbanization, and has a 
great deal of low-cost greenhouse gas abatement options. That explains why many 
economic studies by Zhang (2000a and 2004) and those examined by Stanford 
University’s Energy Modeling Forum (Weyant, 1999) show that China would reap 
significant benefits from participating in a global cap-and-trade regime. Even if such a 
regime is so beneficial to China, why has China consistently refused in international 
negotiations even to discuss its participation in it? In my view, there are at least five 
reasons for China’s stance. 
 
First and most importantly, participating emissions trading requires countries to take on 
emissions caps and developing countries including China and India consider it unfair to 
impose on emissions caps on developing countries in the first place until Annex 1 
countries give clear signs that they have taken the lead required in cutting their 
greenhouse gas emissions. They regard their emissions as survival emissions and those 
from Annex 1 countries as luxury emissions. Many economic studies (Weyant, 1999; 
Zhang, 2000a and 2004) premise that China would take on emissions caps and then 
calculate what outcomes would be for China. This is a classical way to address an issue 
of “what is” in positive economics. But China may not consider it as an issue of “what is”. 
Rather China may consider it as an issue of “what ought to be” in normative economics. 
Moreover, more than half the G77 are even more vulnerable to climate change than the 
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peers in the Group and thus demand deeper cuts in emissions to prevent dangerous 
climate change. Given China’s desire for the unity of the G77, maintaining a united G77 
front would necessitate taking their interests into account. Pushing for stringent 
commitments by Annex 1 countries is just to that end and appears a better negotiation 
tactic to pursue than demanding more generous targets for developing countries 
themselves, in particular given that the current emissions commitments by Annex 1 
countries are far short of what developing countries called for at Kyoto and had been 
relaxed substantially by allowing significant sinks credits in Marrakech Accords.4  
 
Table 2  Quantitative Implications of the Marrakech Accords 
Regiona Baseline 
emissions 
(MtC) 
Nominal 
reduction 
(% wrt 1990) 
Effective 
reduction 
(% wrt 2010) 
Absolute 
cutback 
(MtC wrt 2010) 
 1990 2010 w/o sinks w/t sinks w/o sinks w/t sinks w/o sinks w/t sinks
AUN 88 130 – 6.8 – 9.4 27.6 25.9 36 34 
CAN 126 165 6.0 – 5.2 28.2 19.7 47 32 
EUR 930 1040 7.8 6.2 17.5 16.1 182 168 
JPN 269 330 6.0 1.1 23.4 19.4 77 64 
EEC 279 209 7.1 4.9 – 24.0 – 26.9 -50 – 56 
FSU 853 593 0 – 4.2 – 43.8 – 49.8 –260 – 296 
Total w/o USb 2545 2467 4.3 0.9 1.3 – 2.2 32 – 54 
USA 1345 1809 7.0 3.7 30.9 28.4 558 514 
Total w/t USc 3890 4276 5.2 1.9 13.8 10.8 590 460 
 
                                                 
4 Significant sinks credits allowed in the Marrakech Accords relax the emissions targets 
substantially. Table 2 contains the nominal percentage reductions with respect to (wrt) 
1990 emissions levels and the effective percentage reductions with respect to baseline 
emissions in 2010 for both the original Kyoto emissions targets and the revised targets 
under the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakech Accords. As a result of allowing countries 
to count the amount of sinks credits, the average reduction target for the Annex B 
countries as a whole is reduced to 1.9 percent, in comparison with the original reduction 
target of 5.2 percent (Löschel and Zhang, 2002). 
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a AUN – Australia and New Zealand; CAN – Canada; EUR - OECD Europe; JPN – 
Japan; EEC - Central and Eastern European countries; FSU - Former Soviet Union. 
b Annex B total without the U.S. ratification. 
c Annex B total with the U.S. ratification. 
Source: Löschel and Zhang (2002). 
 
Second, China and India have been sceptical to international emissions trading. First, 
they are not convinced that international emissions trading would lead to actual 
reductions in emissions; instead, it would merely shift reductions overseas and is seen to 
be a way for industrialized countries to avoid undertaking costly abatement actions at 
home.5 Second, China and India regard the present rather arbitrary allocation of assigned 
amounts to industrialised countries based on historical emission levels under the Kyoto 
Protocol as attempts to create new property rights for the atmosphere. At the international 
climate negotiations, they made it clear that any trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol does not bestow rights or entitlements to Annex B countries (UNFCCC, 1999). 
China and India insist that before emissions trading commences, the entitlements of both 
developed and developing countries have to be defined (Sharma, 1998). Third, China may 
consider that benefits of CDM projects are real and at the same time, may perceive the 
positive outcomes that have been demonstrated in domestic emissions trading elusive. In 
principle, greenhouse gases offer an even more attractive case for application of emissions 
trading than many local pollutants already well handled with emissions trading. However, 
at the international level, emissions trading is untested. The successful U.S. SO2 Allowance 
                                                 
5 In his statement to the COP3, Chen Yaobang, head of the Chinese delegation, rejected 
emissions trading and joint implementation schemes, insisting that these schemes were 
unacceptable because they would allow industrialised countries to shirk their 
responsibilities of cutting emissions at home while disregarding the living’s environment 
of people in other countries (People’s Daily, 1997).  
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Trading Program cannot just be transplanted to the international terrain where legal and 
institutional ingredients differ substantially from those in the U.S., not to mention no 
institutional supports for operating emissions trading in place in the majority of developing 
countries. This leaves it doubtful that China would perceive that emissions trading would 
work in practice to its advantage. 
 
Third, China may perceive an inflow of CDM investment in China much less politically 
sensitive than the exports of emissions permits to the U.S.. In practice, CDM investment is 
most likely to be a climate component added to existing and future FDI (foreign direct 
investment) projects. Even in the optimistic case where the U.S. were in the Kyoto Protocol, 
the total inflow of CDM investment in China in 2010 would be estimated to be a value of 
US$ 1.7 billion even in the optimistic case of full global emissions trading (Zhang, 2000a). 
This is only few percentages of the current total FDI in China, which amounted to US$ 52 
billion in 2002. FDI has been serving as a powerful engine driving China’s economic 
growth, and is perceived positively both inside and outside China. Binding with FDI 
would make an inflow of CDM investment in China become less explicit from those who 
regard CDM as “foreign aid”.6 By contrast, the U.S. has already had huge trade deficit 
with China, and exporting a large volume of surplus permits from China to the U.S. 
would further deteriorate the U.S. trade balance sheet with China.7 
                                                 
6  Rep. Bill Archer (R-Texas), Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, for 
example, said that “It is another form of foreign aid” (Congressional Quarterly, 29 
November 1997). 
7 McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) suggest that massive exports of permits would lead to 
appreciation of the exporting country’s exchange rate and a decline in its exports other 
than permits. If China’s exports of permits to the U.S. would counteract a decline in 
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 Fourth, China is concerned about the implications of “lock in” to emissions cap, in 
particular no rules and principles for setting emissions targets for the commitment periods 
subsequent to Kyoto. With the EU bubble treating its poorer member countries more 
leniently8 and the Russia Federation widely perceived to have been granted generous 
targets at Kyoto, it is conceivable that industrialized countries will use the same tactics to 
bribe developing countries, giving them more generous emissions targets to enlist them to 
assume emissions commitments. No doubt, granting generous targets would be much less 
unattractive to developing countries than asking more stringent targets. Developing 
countries can even gain in the short term, provided that their targets are set even above 
their business-as-usual levels. But once developing countries assume emissions 
commitments, they are expected to take even more stringent targets over time, which are 
generally reviewed by developing countries themselves as impeding their economic 
development prospects. What matters is the balance between this short-term benefits and 
                                                                                                                                                 
China’s exports of goods and services to the U.S., then the U.S. trade balance sheet with 
China would not be deteriorated.  
8 The 15 member countries of the EU are each listed with an 8% reduction from 1990 
levels in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol. In June 1998, the EU Council reached an 
agreement under which the commitments are redistributed among its member countries 
under the bubble provision as specified in Article 4 of the Protocol. This will now serve 
as the basis of EU ratification and the redefined targets will become the “quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments” for each EU member country under the 
Protocol. Comparing the differentiated targets with the EU common 8% reduction 
commitments, we can see that the redistribution of the commitments has allocated more 
assigned amounts to the poor countries, whose emissions are expected to rise fast, than 
their allowed levels under the Protocol. By permitting a 25-27% increase in emissions to 
Greece and Portugal, the EU internal burden sharing of its Kyoto commitments among 
the member countries clearly indicates that poorer countries should be treated more 
leniently. If Greece and Portugal can have this sort of rise, it would be very difficult for 
the EU to reject the demand from the really poor, that is, developing countries, for a not 
unreasonable leeway in emissions. 
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the perceived long-term costs to developing countries in terms of restrictions to future 
economic growth. In this regard, rules and principles for setting emissions targets for the 
commitment periods subsequent to Kyoto would help developing countries to make 
informed decision on whether to take on commitments. Unless such principles are put in 
place, developing countries would be reluctant to assume commitments in the first place, 
even if hardly challenging.  
 
Fifth, although many economic studies show that China would reap significant benefits 
from participating a global cap-and-trade regime, they don’t really address the complex 
undertaking of setting emissions caps for developing countries. Emissions targets of 
Annex B countries are set against their historically observed levels. But for developing 
countries, their living standards are still very low in comparison with their industrialized 
counterparts, and they have legitimate demand for further development and economic 
growth. Thus, unlike Annex B countries, their targets, if any, must be linked to future, 
unobserved levels. Moreover, developing country economies tend to fluctuate more than 
those of industrialized countries. This will lead to considerable uncertainties over their 
economic growth rates and thus emissions projections. No doubt, the uncertainties would 
encourage developing countries to assume very pessimistic emissions targets when they 
are asked to take on commitments, thus raising great concern about the danger of 
generating “tropical hot air”. 
 
 
4. The path forward 
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Current international negotiating process is best characterised as pledge-based: countries 
formulate their national positions and negotiate in their own self-interests, voluntarily 
making commitments at their sovereign discretion (Baumert and Kete, 2002). 
Consequently, the bottom-up negotiated results are mainly influenced by bargaining power 
and economic might rather than by objective criteria. With the Kyoto Protocol poised to 
enter into force, discussions of what comes next gain increasing legitimacy, given that the 
Kyoto targets are only the first step towards addressing long-term global climate issue. At 
this conjecture, it is worthwhile rethinking international negotiating process and seeing 
whether it should continue to follow the pledge-based approach. In my view, current 
allocation of assigned amounts under the Kyoto Protocol is too arbitrary and is not a 
promising approach to getting developing countries to assume emissions commitments for 
a number of reasons. First, in China and India’s view, starting from the status quo is 
hardly seen as equitable. Second, assigned amounts of Annex 1 countries under the 
Kyoto Protocol were set rather arbitrarily, and it does not set a good model. Third, the 
current approach involves too costly negotiations and is highly sensitive to bargaining 
power. Fourth, even if 37 Annex 1 countries could barely agree very small reduction at 
Kyoto, what evidence is there that over 180 countries will be able to agree much sharp 
reduction to meet UNFCCC’s ultimate objective? All this clearly calls for objective 
indicators-based (either quantitative or qualitative), fair and equitable allocation of 
emissions targets in the future to avoid reducing everything to politics which happened in 
Kyoto. These objective indicators should measure wide differences in national 
circumstances and avoid a stalemate in which every country claims its unique 
circumstances. The equity principle should also be reflected. Otherwise, the large 
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disparity in per capita carbon emissions between the U.S. and China becomes 
unimportant, while a disparity between the U.S., who would be required to reduce 
emissions, and China, who would not, becomes paramount. International negotiating 
process tends to suggest that rule-based approach works, as demonstrated in the case of 
differentiation of emissions targets among EU member countries. What set of rules would 
be adopted in the end is certainly a matter open to negotiation. For example, once a country 
reaches a threshold level of ability to pay or responsibility, it would be required to assume 
emissions limits. Once agreed, such rules would mitigate some concern about the evolution 
of commitments over time, and would help developing counties to make informed decision 
on assuming commitments. Moreover, making rules clear also helps to smooth out 
fluctuations in the price of permits over time. For example, anticipating accession of bigger 
suppliers in the later period that would reduce the future price of permits, current suppliers 
of permits would adapt their behaviours by selling more permits now instead of banking 
them for sales later in order to maximum their gains. 
 
Moreover, in order to better reflect the specific needs and circumstances of developing 
countries, participation could take different forms. Although current debates on developing 
country commitments have overwhelmingly focused on emissions caps, other forms of 
commitments that are more explicitly linked to needs, responsibility and development 
objectives of developing countries need to be considered to enlist wider participation. In 
my view, other commitments than emissions caps could be a useful step towards assuming 
emissions caps, in particular for the majority of developing countries who are still at the 
low level of development. Even if these countries reach a threshold level of taking on 
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emissions caps, the caps could be initially made non-binding. Clearly, through a series of 
gradual steps, this approach encourages broad participation and builds the trust and 
confidence on accepting legally binding emissions targets in the future. This is probably the 
best way to encourage China and other major developing countries to take on increasing 
degree of responsibility over time, which eventually leads China and other major 
developing countries to assume emissions targets. 
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